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Recent research has argued that incentives stemming from social security systems influence the 
worker’s decision to retire. The experience of Chile, which radically changed its system in 1981, 
offers an opportunity to test this hypothesis. The new system tightened access to early pensions, 
replaced an actuarially unfair defined benefit plan with an actuarially fair defined contribution 
plan, exempted pensioners from the pension payroll tax and allowed widows to keep their own 
pension in addition to their survivor’s benefit. Although the old system is being phased out, since 
1981 the two systems have co-existed. Using probit analysis of the behavior of a retrospective 
sample of new and old system affiliates, we estimate the impact of the new social security rules 
on the probability of dropping out of the labor force, for older workers. We find large effects. 
Age of pensioning has been postponed. Labor force participation is much higher among affiliates 
of the new system compared with the old, especially for pensioners and women. This is not 
simply due to selection: Aggregate participation rates have increased as the new system’s share 



















Social Security Rules and Labor Force Participation of Older Workers: 
Evidence from Chile 
 
Labor force participation of older men has declined in many countries during   
recent decades. This has decreased the available supply of human capital and increased 
the fiscal problems of pension programs. A considerable literature has developed on the 
extent to which incentives stemming from social security systems have contributed 
toward this decline or can help reverse it.  The experience of Chile, which radically 
changed its system in 1981, offers an opportunity to test whether large system changes 
produce large labor supply changes. In a previous study based on changing behavior of 
successive cohorts that were increasingly exposed to the new system, we found that 
younger cohorts postponed pensioning and had a higher labor force participation rate than 
older cohorts—evidence that increasing new-system membership raised work 
propensities (Edwards and James 2008). This paper revisits this topic using individual-
level data. Unlike the previous paper, which focused on men, we are able to include 
women in the current analysis. We are not aware of any other study addressing this 
impact of the Chilean reform.
1 
Prior to 1981 Chile had a traditional pay-as-you defined benefit (DB) system that 
included disincentives to work among older individuals, similar to those found in many 
European countries today. Contribution rates were high, allowable pension ages low and 
benefits didn’t change commensurately with incremental contributions or postponed 
pensions. Workers had strong incentives to start their pensions as soon as possible 
because this maximized their lifetime net benefits, and labor force participation dropped 2 
 
dramatically when pensions started. This changed with the 1981 reform, which reduced 
the pension payroll tax, replaced the DB system with a defined contribution (DC) system 
and included several other important changes expected to raise the labor force 
participation rates of older individuals. Workers then in the labor force had a choice 
between staying in the old system or switching to the new system.  New entrants to the 
labor force had to join the new system. Thus, for some time the two systems have co-
existed, although the old system is gradually being phased out and an increasing 
proportion of worker belonged to the new system after 1981.  
In this paper we focus on differences between the new and old systems during the 
period when they co-existed. We look, in particular, at the behavior of different 
subgroups that were affected differentially by the complex rule changes. We hypothesize 
that: (1) the reduction in pension payroll tax and move toward greater actuarial fairness 
increased incentives for non-pensioners to voluntarily postpone pensioning and work 
longer—but we expect this effect to be relatively small; (2) the elimination of restrictions 
on continued work for pensioners and their complete exemption from the pension payroll 
tax increased work incentives for pensioners even more; (3) tighter early pension pre-
conditions increased the proportion of older individuals required to remain as non-
pensioners who had to work longer because of liquidity constraints; (4) the increase in 
years of eligibility (from 10 to 20 years) required for the minimum pension guarantee 
(MPG) further encouraged low earners (disproportionately women) to postpone 
pensioning and withdrawal from the labor force; and (5) married women and widows 
were encouraged to work longer because they can keep their own pension in addition to 
the survivor’s benefit, whereas previously they faced a 100% tax on their own pension in 
order to get survivors’ benefits. 3 
 
To carry out this analysis we draw on a retrospective sample of new and old 
system affiliates conducted in 2002, 2004 and 2006 (ESP 2002, 2004 and 2006), which 
gives us their work histories and demographic data going back to 1980. We use probit 
analysis of the behavior of a panel of about 6000 older men and women who were born 
1931-56 and whose histories were observed retrospectively for the period 1980-2006. We 
study their pension and work behavior at ages 50-70. Our main findings: Labor force 
participation rates rose dramatically and pension age was postponed among new system 
affiliates. This holds for most sub-groups but it is strongest for pensioners and women. 
Non-pensioners work longer than pensioners but their participation rates did not increase 
as much so the gap narrowed after the reform. These behavioral effects of the reform 
remain after controlling for many individual and time-specific co-variates.  
The main challenge to these results is the possibility of selection and maturation 
bias. Individuals with greater work propensities may have chosen the new system, which 
rewards marginal work more than the old system. To analyze whether selection is driving 
these results, we contrast the behavior of the main sample with the behavior of earlier and 
later cohorts that had little or no system choice because they were too old or too young in 
1981 to choose. Our results are unchanged when the low-choice cohorts are added. In 
addition, average age-adjusted participation rates for both systems combined increased 
over time as the proportion of new-system affiliates increased, so we are not simply 
observing a rearrangement of people with unchanged behavior. Both these results suggest 
that selection bias is not driving the new-system effect. (Also see Edwards and James 
2008). The latter result also indicates that the new-system effect is not an illusion caused 
by differential maturities of the two systems.  4 
 
Part 1 reviews the literature on the impact of social security system rules on 
retirement age and develops our hypotheses about work and pension incentives in the 
new versus old Chilean schemes. Part II describes our data set, probit model, reform 
indicators and other variables. Part III estimates the impact of the reform on the 
probability of becoming a pensioner and of dropping out of the labor force for older men 
and women. The Conclusion highlights lessons for other countries.  
I. What do Theory and Empirical Evidence Suggest about Retirement Choice? 
Retirement behavior and pension systems: theoretical framework 
An adaptation of the options value method of measuring marginal retirement 
incentives used by Gruber and Wise (2004) is the starting point for our analysis of the 
impact of the Chilean reform. According to this model, workers calculate the expected 
present value (EPV) of incomes for all future potential retirement dates. They postpone 
retirement beyond the earliest eligible age (t) to some future date (r), if the utility from 
the incremental EPV of net wages plus incremental lifetime benefit growth from work 
between t and r exceeds the utility from incremental leisure between t and r.  
U[EPV∑(W-C)
tr +
 EPV∑(B(r)-B(t))] > U(L
tr)      ( 1 )  
where:  
EPV∑(W-C)
tr = exp. net wages  (gross wages-contributions) between t and r 
EPV∑(B(r)-B(t)) =exp. added benefits from postponing retirement from t to r 
U(L
tr) = discounted utility of incremental leisure between t and r 
For many individuals, their social security wealth (EPV∑B) in mandatory systems 
exceeds the amount they would have saved voluntarily. This increases the relative 
marginal value they place on leisure, hence their desire to stop work earlier than they 
would have otherwise. However, work rarely stops before the pension starts because of 5 
 
liquidity constraints. This wealth effect on leisure preference is one reason workers start 
the pension at the earliest eligible age and stop work at the same time, in any system that 
mandates postponed consumption. 
Gruber and Wise focus on another factor that exists in many systems--the 
incentive effect on retirement stemming from the absence of marginal actuarial fairness. 
In a system that is actuarially fair at the margin, incremental contributions yield added 
monthly benefits with an equivalent EPV and postponing the pension raises monthly 
benefits enough to hold EPV∑B constant so  
EPV[∑(B(r)-B(t))-∑C
rt]   =   0            ( 2 )  
(see  Disney, Queisser and Whitehouse 2006). In that case, equation (1) collapses into 
equation (3), and work continues so long as:  
U[EPV∑(W)
tr] > U(L
tr)           ( 3 )  
In contrast, in an actuarially unfair system this equality between incremental 
benefits and contributions does not hold. Gruber and Wise (1999 and 2004) show that DB 
systems are often actuarially unfair. Specifically, the EPV of incremental benefits 
(∑(B(r)-B(t)) is less than the EPV of incremental contributions for those who work 
longer, creating a tax wedge between gross and net remuneration and leading work to 
stop in accordance with equation (1), sooner than it would under equation (3). Moreover, 
work is often restricted or penalized once the pension starts. As a result of these system 
rules, two potentially separable decisions--starting the pension and stopping work— are 
de facto linked, a single term—retirement--is commonly used to denote them, and 
workers retire at the earliest eligible age. As government policies have reduced the 
earliest eligible pension age, increased the tax wedge and mandated the growth of 6 
 
pension wealth, retirement age has dropped in many countries.  Chile fit this picture 
before 1981. 
Retirement rule changes in the Chilean reform and how they affect behavior 
The Chilean pension reform was a complex package, with many rule changes. 
Starting with a system that charged a high payroll tax, that was decidedly unfair 
actuarially, that tied the work and pension decisions together and made early retirement 
easy, the reform moved toward lower tax rates, payroll tax exemption for pensioners, 
fewer work restrictions, greater actuarial fairness, tighter conditions for early retirement 
and MPG eligibility and more pro-work policies for women.  
Moving toward lower payroll taxes and actuarial fairness by replacing DB with 
DC. The old Chilean system consisted of several sub-systems, with different details but 
similar general outlines. In the largest sub-system, Servicio Seguro Social (SSS), the 
payroll tax for pensions was 23%, with another 10% for other social insurance, bringing 
the total to 33%.
2 The monthly defined benefit was 50% of the base wage for the first ten 
years of service but only 1% additional for each year thereafter, until a 70% ceiling was 
reached, at which point the incremental benefit became 0. Postponing the pension did not 
increase the benefit nor did greater life expectancy decrease it. Benefits were not 
automatically price-indexed, but ad hoc increases occurred. As in many other countries 
with traditional systems, workers were likely to start the pension and stop work as soon 
as they became eligible for the pension.  
In the new system, each worker is required to contribute 10% of his or her wages 
to an individual DC account, plus another 2-2.5% for administrative fees and disability 
and survivors insurance, totaling about half the old rate.
3 Contributions are invested in a 
pension fund (AFP) of the worker’s choice and accumulate a market rate of return that 7 
 
averaged over 10% real per year for the first 20 years of the system. Payouts must take 
the form of price-indexed annuities or gradual withdrawals over the person’s lifetime. 
Most retirees purchase annuities, delayed annuitization increases the monthly pension 
commensurately, and annuities have had a money’s worth ratio of 100% or more (James, 
Martinez and Iglesias 2006). Thus, the new system is actuarially fair in the sense that the 
EPV of lifetime benefits equals the EPV of lifetime contributions and incremental 
contributions or postponed pensioning are rewarded with equivalent expected real 
benefits, discounted at the risk-free market rate of return. This reduction in explicit and 
implicit taxes might lead to delayed pensioning and longer work, on a voluntary basis. 
Eliminating work restrictions and payroll tax for all pensioners. In the old 
system, continued work in the public sector was not allowed once the worker started the 
pension. Private sector work was allowed, but often workers had to change jobs upon 
pensioning. Moreover, contributions had to continue so long as the individual worked, 
even if he had already pensioned and got little or no additional benefit.  In contrast, in the 
new system pensioners can continue working, with no restrictions. They are totally 
exempt from the pension payroll tax after pensioning. In effect, this makes the system 
fully actuarially fair with respect to continued work by   pensioners. Their nominal net 
wage rises by 14% (12.5/87.5) after pensioning (or by 7% if the implicit tax component 
was 50%). This exemption for pensioners should increase their incentive to work.  
 Tightening the conditions for early pensioning. In the old system, normal pension 
age was 65 for men, 55-60 for women, but earlier retirement based on length of service, 
disability or for other reasons was common.
4  In the new system, normal pension age is 
65 for men, 60 for women, and early pensioning was not permitted before 1988. Starting 
in 1988 it was allowed, but subject to tight restrictions. Until 2004 the retirement 8 
 
accumulation had to provide a benefit that was at least 50% of the worker’s own average 
wage and 110% of the minimum pension guarantee (MPG), for pensioning prior to 60/65. 
Recently these were raised to 70% and 150%, respectively (Edwards and James 2006; 
James, Martinez and Iglesias, 2006).
5 Note that in the new system retirement savings are 
converted into pensions on actuarially fair terms. Therefore this constraint will become 
more binding over time as expected longevity rises, thereby reducing monthly payouts 
unless pension age is postponed. The new early retirement rules may be especially 
binding for individuals with less education, whose own-pensions are closer to the MPG.  
The minimum pension guarantee. The new and old systems both contain a 
minimum pension guarantee (MPG). If an eligible worker’s own-pension is less than the 
MPG, the government tops it up to bring it to the floor—so low-earners have a strong 
incentive to become eligible.
6 Once they are eligible for the MPG top-up, any further 
wage or own-pension for low earners replaces government dollars one for one—a strong 
disincentive for them to work. This applies in both systems.  
However, the new and old systems have different eligibility requirements—20 
years of contributions in the new system, only 10 years for women and some men in the 
old system. Also, in the new system the MPG is reduced for early pensioners. Therefore, 
new-system affiliates whose own-pensions will be in the vicinity of the MPG have a 
strong incentive to postpone pensioning and work longer, up to the 20-year point, in order 
to qualify.
7  
This data set does not inform us of the worker’s retirement accumulation, so we 
are unable to identify those whose potential pension is in the neighborhood of the MPG. 
Also, the retrospective employment histories do not go back beyond 1980 so we do not 
know which individuals are near, far above or far below the 20-years required for 9 
 
eligibility. However, we know that women affiliates and men with less than secondary 
education have relatively low earnings, hence are probable candidates for the MPG and 
will benefit from passing the 20-year threshold. These are the same groups that will have 
a hard time meeting the new system’s early retirement pre-conditions. The tighter MPG 
eligibility requirements constitute an additional reason why these groups may postpone 
pensioning and work longer in the new system than the old.   
Treatment of survivors’ benefits for women. Both in the new and old systems 
women whose husbands die receive survivors’ benefits. (Until 2008 men were not 
eligible for survivors’ benefits unless they were financially dependent on their wives, 
because they were disabled). In the old system this was provided through the DB system 
and the widow could not keep her own pension in addition to the survivors’ benefit; she 
had to give up one, usually her own, which was smaller. In the new system, survivors’ 
benefits are provided through private group insurance contracts while the spouse is 
working and the required purchase of a joint pension when he retires. Perhaps because 
these are not viewed as being financed by the common pool, widows are permitted to 
keep the survivor’s benefit in addition to their own. The 100% tax on own-pension that 
most women previously faced was eliminated, which should encourage their work. 
Hypotheses about how these rule changes will change behavior  
In the new system we must distinguish between two dimensions of retirement: 
starting the pension and stopping work. Tightened early retirement pre-conditions lead to 
postponed pensioning because of binding constraints. In addition, if workers regard the 
new system as actuarially fair, they will be indifferent between postponing the pension 
versus starting it, so long as they are savers; thus some persons who want to save will 
choose to remain non-pensioners longer than they did previously.  10 
 
However, if a tax wedge still exists between net and gross remuneration, many 
individuals will continue to start the pension as early as possible, as they did before. We 
expect that such a wedge may remain, albeit smaller than before. Many individuals 
(especially those with little voluntary saving) may not regard the new system as 
completely fair, because their own subjective discount rates for time or risk do not 
coincide with market rates.
8 In general, restrictions on saving rate, investments and 
payouts are inevitable in mandatory defined contribution social security systems, yet 
heterogeneity among workers implies varying savings-consumption and risk-return 
preferences. The resulting divergence between subjective and market discount rates for 
time and risk maintains a tax wedge between incremental contributions and benefits and 
thus between gross and net remuneration from work, even in systems that are supposedly 
actuarially fair. It has been estimated that, on average, a 50% implicit pension tax 
remains in Chile.
9 This would mitigate the willingness to voluntarily postpone pensioning 
and withdrawal from the labor force as a result of the move toward actuarial fairness.
10  
After pensioning, work can continue without contributions, so the wedge between 
net and gross wage disappears and the work decision depends solely on gross wage-
leisure trade-offs.  
 We therefore expect to find the following new-system effects on participation 
rates of older workers: 
1.  The new system may increase participation rates of non-pensioners due to 
increased actuarial fairness. That is, we may observe a behavioral shift from equation (1) 
to equation (3). However, this effect may be small because the system remains 
incompletely fair to many workers.  11 
 
2. The new system will increase participation rates of pensioners, due to the 
removal of restrictions on their right to work and their exemption from the pension 
payroll tax.  Equation (3) applies in these cases.  
3. The new system will postpone age of pensioning due to tighter early retirement 
pre-conditions. This will apply particularly to individuals with less education, who will 
have the hardest time meeting the new system’s requirements. Since non-pensioners have 
higher participation rates than pensioners because of liquidity constraints, this will further 
increase participation rates in equations that do not control for pension status. The new-
system impact on age of pensioning should fall at age 60 for women, 65 for men, at 
which point they are eligible to retire regardless of accumulation. 
4. Men with low education and women, who are low earners, may also work 
longer before and after pensioning in order to meet the new system’s 20-year requirement 
for eligibility for the MPG. 
5. Widows and women more generally are encouraged to work longer because the 
100% tax on own-pensions that they previously faced, as (potential and actual) recipients 
of survivors’ benefits, has been removed.  
One purpose of this paper is to compare the effects of rules that change incentives 
versus constraints. For example, actuarial fairness and tighter early retirement pre-
conditions might both lead to postponed pensioning, but if the latter dominates, 
postponement should become much weaker after age 60/65, when the constraints 
disappear. Another purpose is to compare the new-system effects of the reduction in 
implicit taxes due to actuarial fairness for non-pensioners versus the elimination of 
explicit taxes for old age and survivors’ pensioners. If the latter effect is stronger, we 
expect pensioners and women to exhibit the largest new-system effects on participation 12 
 
rates. A third object is to compare impacts on men and women, who may be affected 
differentially by these rules.  
Previous empirical studies on the U.S. and other countries 
During the past decade a large empirical literature has developed to investigate 
the falling labor force participation rate among older men and the impact of pension 
system wealth and rules. The benchmark studies by Gruber, Wise and their colleagues 
(1999 and 2004) measure retirement incentives facing older men across eleven 
industrialized countries and through time. They show large work disincentives stemming 
from defined benefit social security systems, and the greater these disincentives the less 
likely individuals are to postpone retirement. Borsch-Supan (1998) finds similar effects 
for Germany and other European countries. A recent study by Lluberas (2007) finds that 
workers in DC plans expect to retire later than those in DB plans. Butler, Huguenin and 
Teppa (2004) attribute the falling labor supply of older men in Switzerland to the 
maturing of generous mandatory pension plans, which increased their pension wealth. 
Workers spend this wealth on longer periods of retirement leisure.  
Several studies use U.S. data to examine the impact of social security wealth, 
implicit tax incentives and early retirement rules. They find small to modest effects that 
vary by income and marital status, and a discontinuous drop in labor force participation at 
the earliest and normal age of eligibility for pensioning (Hurd 1990, Fields and Mitchell 
1984, Burtless and Moffitt 1986, Stock and Wise 1990, Krueger and Pischke 1992, Blau 
1994, Gustman and Steinmeyer 1985, Anderson, Gustman and Steinmeyer 1999, Coile 
and Gruber 2001). Song and Manchester (2006) find that the removal in 2000 of the 
retirement earnings test (which reduced benefits for pensioners who earned wages) 
increased work propensities substantially, especially among older individuals in the 13 
 
higher income percentiles. Friedberg (2007) summarizes various explanations for the 
recent trend toward delayed retirement in the U.S. (much smaller than that in Chile), 
including the elimination of the penalty for working while collecting social security 
benefits and the increased increment from delaying the start of benefits. Pang, 
Warshawsky and Weitzer (2008) find that increases in pension and other wealth raise the 
probability of retiring while the shift from employer-sponsored DB to DC plans delays 
retirement. 
A previous study by the authors (Edwards and James 2008) used data from 47 
years of repeated cross sections to examine changes in pension probabilities and labor 
force participation rates in Chile before and after the reform. The raw data show sharp 
reduction in pension probabilities and sharp increases in pensioner’s labor force 
participation rates among older men in the post reform years. Using probit analysis to 
isolate reform-related changes, with the person’s birth cohort proxying the probability of 
new-system affiliation, we estimate an increase of 16 percentage points in the 
participation rates of cohorts that recently entered the 50-59 age range, and 17 percentage 
points for ages 60-64, relative to pre-reform rates. Part of this increase is due to higher 
work propensities among pensioners and another large part is due to tighter early 
retirement restrictions that constrain individuals to postpone pensioning. The impact of  
actuarial fairness on the behavior of non-pensioners was ambiguous.  
The previous paper covered a long time period and enabled us to study cohort 
changes in participation rates over time, both before and after the reform. This approach 
had the advantage that it avoided issues of selection into the new system, since it 
measured changes in the behavior of cohorts that had mixed affiliation. However, it did 
not lend itself to analysis of individual-level behavior since it did not tell us which system 14 
 
the individual was in, what kind of pension he got (old age, disability or survivors), or 
when he retired. Because many women receive survivors’ pensions, which may imply 
different incentives and lead to different behavior from old age pensions, we were not 
able to analyze women in the previous paper. The current data set covers a smaller period 
of time and has data on work histories only since 1980, but provides richer individual-
level data, including system affiliation and type of pension. Therefore, it enables us to 
compare the work behavior of old and new system members, including both men and 
women, after the reform.  
II. Data, Probit Model and Reform Indicators 
To carry out this analysis, we use a recent restrospective survey of new and old 
system affiliates (EPS2002, 2004 and 2006). EPS is a large retrospective survey, with 
about 20,000 observations, that was conducted in 2002, 2004 and 2006.
11 It is 
representative of the working age population, including new and old system affiliates and 
those who are not affiliated to any system, between 1981 and 2006. Through 
retrospective questions, the survey establishes which periods the person was working, 
unemployed or out of the labor force during 1980-2006, to which system he or she was 
affiliated, if and when the individual was pensioned, what type of pension he or she 
receives (old age, survivors or disability), pension date and amount (if relevant), and data 
on schooling, health, gender and marital status. We are interested in the propensity of 
these individuals to become old age pensioners and to withdraw from the labor market, 
and whether these propensities are different under the new and old systems, after 
controlling for other factors that might influence these decisions.  
Using the three surveys, we build an unbalanced panel of 3,628 men and 2,534 
women who were born between 1931 and 1956 and whose retrospective data reflect their 15 
 
working status between ages 50 and 70.  Each individual enters into our sample as an 
observation for each year in which he or she falls into our target age group. Because the 
retrospective questionnaire covers the period 1980-2006, individuals born in 1956 (who 
were 50 in 2006) contribute with one year to the panel, while those born in 1931 (who 
were 49 in 1980) contribute with 21 years.  Most individuals (92% of men and 77% of 
women) are affiliated to a pension system and of these, 60% of men and 48% of women 
are new system affiliates (see Tables A1 and 1).  We link these data to variables that 
measure macroeconomic conditions for each year of the survey.  
We include in our sample all affiliates who were non-pensioners and all recipients 
of old age and survivors’ pensions but we do not include recipients of other types of 
pensions such as disability or PASIS pensions, because they were subject to differing and 
complex incentives and selection. We drop non-pensioners at the point when they began 
to receive these other pension-types. We exclude individuals who were not affiliated to 
any system—a larger group for women than for men. Thus, we are focusing on the 
impact of system rules on those who were subject to these rules and had some attachment 
to the formal labor market at some point in their lives. This gives us observations of 
3,267 men and 2,438 women for an average of ten years each, comprising 34,070 men-
years and 24,978 women-years.  
Of course, old system members come disproportionately from earlier cohorts and 
are observed disproportionately at older ages than new-system members. Nevertheless, 
there is substantial overlap in ages and cohorts observed in the old and new systems 
(Table A1). Unadjusted work probabilities are significantly higher in the new system 
compared to the old system, for both genders (Figure 1A and 1B). In the next section we 16 
 
add controls for age and other individual and time-specific co-variates that might affect 
these outcomes. 
Given the age composition of our sample and the years of observation, all of the 
old system affiliates in 2006 started out in the old system while the majority of new 
system affiliates started out in the old system and switched to the new system in 1981-82.   
To the extent that affiliation is not a random assignment we must pay attention to the 
possibility of system choice being correlated with other variables that affect labor force 
participation.  In a later section we test for the presence of selection bias. For this part of 
the analysis, we build an augmented sample that includes cohorts with little or no choice-
-older cohorts born between 1921 and 1930, most of whom had to be in the old system, 
and younger cohorts born between 1957 and 1966, most of whom had to be in the new 
system.  
Probit model of retirement and pension probabilities 
We use probit analysis to estimate retirement probabilities for older individuals.  
Our main dependent variable is the individual’s labor force participation rate (LFPi), 
which we model as a function of the individual’s affiliation with the new or old systems 
(Si), controlling for personal and family characteristics (Xi), pension status (Pi) and time-
specific macro-economic conditions as represented by unemployment rate (UnEt)—all 
variables that influence the person’s potential wage and willingness to trade-off wage for 
leisure. In our reduced form probit model:  
Pr(LFPi=1|Si, Xi, Pi,,UnEt) = Φ(SiδL+ XiβL+ Piλ +UnEtγL)     (5) 
where Φ is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution and SiδL+ XiβL+ Piλ 
+UnEtγL is the probit score for the LFP probit model. The model estimates a set of 
parameters that measure the effect of covariates on the probit score, and thus on the 17 
 
probability of LFP. We are particularly interested in δL, which measures the effect of the 
pension reform on labor force participation. We also display these probabilities separately 
for these pensioners and non-pensioners, given the possibility that these two groups will 
behave differently. We include pension amount (Bi) and time since pensioning (TPi) as 
additional variables for pensioners. 
As a subsidiary point, to see whether pensioning has been postponed by the 
reform, we also estimate the probability of being a pensioner:  
Pr(PENi=1| Si, Xi, UnE,) = Φ(Siδp + Xiβp+UnEtγp)           ( 6 )  
where RcδP +XiβP+UnEtγP is the probit score for the PEN model.   
There is a basic difference between the LFP and PEN equations. Once a person 
pensions, he or she stays pensioned; it is a once-and-for-all decision. For reasons given 
above, we expect that in the new system, as in the old, most individuals will start the 
pension as soon as possible; but we expect this action to be postponed in the new system 
because of tighter early retirement and MPG eligibility rules.  
In contrast, the LFP decision is remade each month or year, since people can and 
do move in and out of employment.  This paper models the LFP decision in each year as 
separable from previous years and pension status and amount as given by previous 
decisions which are immutable once the individual becomes a pensioner.
12   
Variables used in the panel analysis 
In our panel analysis we explain pension probabilities and participation rates of 
older individuals as a function of system affiliation, individual-specific time-invariant co-
variates (gender, education as a proxy for potential earnings and pension, birth cohort), 
individual-specific variables that vary over time (age, pensioner status and amount, years 
since pension began, marital status) and macro-economic time effects (unemployment 18 
 
rate).
13 (See Table 1 for list of sample characteristics). We focus on the new-system effect 
and the variables that are hypothesized to influence its magnitude—pension status, 
gender, education and age.  Hypotheses and findings about the other variables are 
discussed in the Appendix. Since the higher work incentives facing new system members 
vary depending on whether they are men or women, pensioners or non-pensioners, high 
or low earners, we calculate the marginal impact of the new system separately by gender, 
pensioner status and level of education. 
System affiliation (Si). Reform indicators are the main variables in our empirical 
analysis.  In a previous paper we used the individual’s birth cohort as an indicator of the 
probability that he was in the new system (Edwards and James 2008). In this case, we 
know the system affiliation directly. Individuals who were in the old system in 2006 
were, by definition, in the old system for all of their working lives. Individuals who were 
in the new system in 2006 were in the new system for their entire working lives if they 
entered the labor force after the reform. If they entered before the reform they were in the 
old system initially, then switched. The data do not give us the switching year, but we 
know that most switching occurred between 1981-83. We assign them to the old system 
until 1982, the new system thereafter (see discussion of the switching decision and 
selection bias below).  
Pension status (Pi).  In the labor force participation analysis, we include 
specifications with and without pensioner status as a co-variate.  Non-pensioners are 
more likely to work than pensioners because of liquidity constraints--they do not yet have 
access to their pension wealth for consumption. Therefore, tighter early retirement rules 
that increase the proportion of non-pensioners should increase the probability of work, in 
specifications that do not control for pension status. In specifications that do control for 19 
 
pensioner status, we expect this to have a negative direct impact on work propensities in 
both systems. But the new system should have a particularly strong positive impact on 
the labor force participation of pensioners, because of the removal of work restrictions 
and their exemption from the pension payroll tax. The pensioner-non-pensioner LFP gap 
should fall.  We also investigate the possibility that selection into pensioner status may 
vary across systems and influence these results. 
Education. Education is represented by a dummy for persons who acquired at a 
complete secondary education or more.
14  It is a proxy for permanent earning capacity. 
On the one hand, higher education exerts a lifetime income or wealth effect that might 
lead to earlier withdrawal from the labor force; but on the other hand it also has a positive 
substitution effect on work propensities, by raising the pecuniary reward for work and 
giving access to more interesting jobs. The net impact of education on participation rates 
of older workers is therefore uncertain a priori.  
More important for our purposes, we expect that the marginal impact of the new 
system on pension probabilities and participation rates will vary for people with and 
without secondary education.  Those without secondary education are less likely to 
satisfy the new pension eligibility conditions which would allow them to stop work early 
with a pension, while they could do so more easily in the old system. This would lead to a 
more negative reform effect on pension probabilities and a more positive reform effect on 
participation rates for less educated workers. The tighter 20-year requirement for the 
MPG may strengthen this interaction of reform effect with education. 
Gender. Men and women may react differently to the new system because of their 
different life circumstances. Older women have worked less in their younger ages than 
older men, and earned lower wages. They had less education, because of the gender 20 
 
differences in schooling until the last two decades, and this in turn lead to lower labor 
force participation, wages and pension accumulations. We include in this study only 
those who are affiliated to a social security system, which means they have worked in the 
market to some extent--but less than men. Therefore, they are less likely to be able to 
pension early in the new system; the tighter restrictions are more binding for them. Also, 
they are more likely to be candidates for the MPG, and consequently have a further 
incentive to postpone pensioning and withdrawal from the labor market until they achieve 
eligibility. For both these reasons, we expect a stronger reform impact on women, 
regardless of educational levels. 
In both systems, marriage may have a positive direct impact on men’s 
participation rates because they wish to support a spouse and children, and a negative 
direct impact on women’s participation, because they have a spouse to support them. 
However, the treatment of survivors’ benefits may increase the positive new-system 
effect for women, especially married women and widows. In the old system, wives had to 
give up their own pension to get the survivor’s benefit. Their contributions then became a 
pure tax. In the new system this tax is removed as women are permitted to keep their own 
pension in addition to the survivor’s benefit. In contrast, men had to forego part of their 
own-pension in order to purchase a joint pension that covered their wives, upon 
retirement. This is another reason why we would expect a larger new-system effect on 
participation rates for women than for men.  
This would hold for widows and also for married women who are not yet 
widowed but anticipate they may be some day.  However, to the extent that people are 
myopic and respond more strongly to immediate incentives, women receiving survivors’ 
benefits will exhibit a particularly high new-system effect. They are relieved of two taxes 21 
 
on their labor--the pension payroll tax and the crowd-out by the survivor’s benefit of their 
own-pension. Therefore, the marginal new-system effect may be more positive for 
women on survivors’ benefits than for other women or for men on old age benefits.  
Age. Since pension probability increases and participation decreases with age and 
the new and old systems had different age distributions, it is important to control for age. 
In our probits we treat age as a continuous variable and we also introduce a dummy for 
women who are over age 60 and men who are over 65. In addition, age affects the 
marginal new-system effect, since the rules vary by age. At 60 for women, 65 for men, all 
workers can start their pension, regardless of accumulation size. Therefore, the new-
system constraints on early pensioning should end at that point.  
III. Results: Impact of Reform on Pension and Participation Probabilities  
Tables A1 and A2 present our probit estimates and the Appendix also discusses 
the co-variates that determine pension and work probabilities. In the text we concentrate 
on the new-system impact on these probabilities. Tables 2 and 3 show the marginal 
impact of the new system on pension and participation for various groups—over-all and 
broken down by gender, pension status and education levels.   
Reform impact on pension probabilities  
As expected, we find that individuals affiliated to the new system postpone 
pensioning (Table 2). Pension probabilities for men in their 50’s fall by about 14 
percentage points, which is almost half of the old-system average pension probability of 
29%. These numbers seem very large, but they are consistent with the raw data showing 
decreased pension probabilities for older age groups over the period 1981-2004 and with 
our previous analysis of postponed pension probabilities for post-reform male cohorts 
(Figure 2 and Edwards and James, 2008). The decline comes to an end at age 65, as 22 
 
expected. The absolute value of the change is slightly larger for men with secondary 
education, but the value relative to initial pension probabilities is much larger for men 
without secondary schooling, also as expected.   
For women, pension postponement in their 50’s was smaller (about 6 percentage 
points) but still highly significant and somewhat more concentrated on those with 
secondary education. This somewhat surprising result may be due to the limited labor 
market attachment of women—many were probably constrained by the early pension 
requirements in the old system, so the new-system constraints were redundant. Those 
with secondary education were more likely to meet the old-system conditions for early 
retirement but to be constrained by the more stringent new-system requirements.  
Postponed pensioning could be caused by tighter early retirement constraints or 
by voluntary choice under greater actuarial fairness, which made workers more willing to 
save through the pension system.  We cannot directly separate these two sources for 
women under 60 or men under 65. However, since everyone is eligible to start their 
pension by 60/65, postponement beyond those ages is voluntary and would be evidence 
that marginal actuarial fairness has had an impact. In fact, over ages 60/65, our 
estimations show that pension postponement comes to an end—that is, individuals 
eventually get a pension, but they start it later in old age. Thus, tighter constraints on 
early retirement seem to be the dominant reason for postponed pensioning.  
Since the difference in labor force participation rates of male pensioners and non-
pensioners is about 30 percentages points, a 14 percentage point shift of men from 
pensioner to non-pensioner status should increase the average participation rates of men 
in their 50’s by about 4 percentage points and of older men over-all by about 3 
percentage points. For older women, the smaller shift from pensioner to non-pensioner 23 
 
status, combined with a smaller pensioner-non-pensioner participation differential, 
produces a 1 percentage point increase in their average labor force participation rates. 
Reform impact on labor market participation rates  
The reform impact on labor force participation rates is even more striking. In 
Table 3, col. 2, without pension controls, we capture all sources of increased participation 
among pensioners and non-pensioners. Participation rates of the average man goes up 10 
percentage points, compared with an initial participation rate of 65%--a 15% increase. 
Controls for pension status (Table 3, col. 3) indicate that this increase is mainly due to the 
higher rate among pensioners. Participation rates among pensioners go up by 9 
percentage points, which is 21% of their old-system rate. Participation of non-pensioners 
also goes up significantly but only by 6 percentage points, which is 8% of their old-
system rate. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the exemption from the payroll 
tax (experienced by pensioners) is a more powerful motivator than actuarial fairness 
(experienced by non-pensioners). It is also consistent with the raw data, which show 
strongly increased participation rates of older men, especially pensioners, over the period 
1981-2004 and with our previous analysis of rising participation rates for post-reform 
male cohorts (Figure 3 and Edwards and James, 2008). 
Also playing an important role is the shift of individuals into non-pensioner 
status, as pension age is postponed. The average new-system effect goes down by 3.3 
percentage points (10.1 in col. 2-6.8 in col. 3) when we control for pension status. This 
suggests that 32% (3.2/10.1) of the over-all new-system effect on male participation rates 
is due to the increased proportion of non-pensioners, who work more than pensioners. 
(The impact of this increased proportion is eliminated once pension status is controlled, 24 
 
in col. 3). This is consistent with our estimate above of a 3 percentage point impact of 
postponed pensioning on participation rates of older men.  
Among women, participation rates go up 20 percentage points, compared with a 
36% participation rate in the old system—a dramatic 55% increase. In absolute value, 
marginal effects are very similar for pensioners and non-pensioners, but relative to old-
system values they are again much higher for pensioners. Most striking is the huge 
relative new-system effect for women recipients of survivor benefits—their participation 
rates rise by 140% relative to old-system rates. This is consistent with the fact that the 
new system exempted survivor beneficiaries from the pension payroll tax and from the 
tax on their own-pension. Knowing that they could still keep their own pension in the 
future may also help account for the high new-system impact on participation rates of 
older women more broadly, even before they become recipients of survivors’ benefits. 
Below we discuss whether selection and maturation may be contributing to these results, 
especially the high rates among women. 
Both for men and women, increases in participation rates relative to rates for old-
system members are larger for individuals without secondary education. As suggested 
above, it is possible that these low earners continue working late in life, both as 
pensioners and non-pensioners, to become eligible for the MPG.  
Could the larger reform effect on pensioners be due to selection bias? 
The evidence points toward a stronger reform impact on pensioners, as we 
hypothesized. The weaker response among non-pensioners may be due to the fact that the 
system remains actuarially unfair to them (albeit less so than previously) because their 
time and investment preferences are different from those imposed by the system. In 
addition, their gains from longer work are less clear-but, while the total elimination of the 25 
 
pension payroll tax is easy for pensioners to see. Moreover, non-pensioners are already 
working at very high rates so there is not much space for further increases.  
Could the larger response by pensioners be due to selection bias—a change in 
composition among pensioners toward those with higher work propensities and vice 
versa for non-pensioners? Under the old system, some individuals with a high propensity 
to work had to postpone pensioning in order to keep their job. The delinking of work and 
pension choices in the new system means that these individuals can now become 
pensioners and continue to work. At the same time, the tightening of early retirement 
restrictions means that fewer people can satisfy the pre-conditions for pensioning prior to 
age 65. The new system conditions early access to pension on meeting a fund 
accumulation/replacement rate threshold, which is more likely to be achieved by those 
who contributed persistently—because they have higher work propensities. The old 
system granted early retirement status more liberally, and possibly to many with lower 
work propensities. All these effects could raise average participation rates among new-
system pensioners compared with old-system pensioners, due to selection bias into 
pensioner status of those with high work propensities. 
However, our findings are not consistent with selection as the major explanation. 
If the shift of individuals with high work propensities into pensioner status were the main 
reason for the higher work proclivities of new-system pensioners, it follows that labor 
force participation would have fallen for non-pensioners in the new system and would not 
have risen over-all, in specifications where pension status was not controlled. On the 
contrary, we find that non-pensioners remain more likely to work than they did before the 
reform and the increase in participation rates remains (in fact, is larger) when pension 
status is not controlled. This growth in over-all work propensities is consistent with the 26 
 
view that we are observing behavioral change due to new incentives and constraints, 
rather than simply a rearrangement of people with unchanged behaviors.  
Testing for selection bias into the new system: choice versus low-choice groups 
The biggest challenge to these results is the possibility of selection bias into the 
new system. Workers newly entering the labor market after 1981 had to enter the new 
system, but those already working and affiliated to the old system had choice. Most of the 
individuals in our sample were in this choice group. Thus, it is possible that selection bias 
is present in our analysis—individuals with a higher propensity to work may have been 
more likely to switch, so we may be observing the switching decision rather than 
participation change. 
Age in 1981 turns out to be a primary factor influencing the switching decision 
(see Palacios and Whitehouse 1998); younger workers were more likely to switch than 
older workers, because they had more years ahead of them in which to compound interest 
in their accounts in the new DC system. Our sample consists of older workers and we 
control for age differences within this group. But holding age constant, those who 
expected to work longer in the future were more likely to switch than those with a more 
tenuous work attachment, because their contributions would build their accounts in the 
DC system but would yield little or no returns in the old system after 30 years. This 
would lead to a selection into the new system of people who expected to have higher 
participation rates in old age.
15 For our analysis, the important point is that unobserved 
expectations about future participation rates may have influenced the switching decision 
(although many other factors were also at work), so part of our new system effect may be 
due to selection rather than changed behavior.  27 
 
We carried out several tests to investigate this possibility, augmenting our sample 
to include groups who had little or no choice and comparing the behavior of these groups 
with our main sample, most of whom had full choice. The positive new-system effect on 
behavior remains strong, even when the no-choice or low-choice groups are added.  
We start by augmenting our main sample with 2 sub-groups: 1) those who were 
born 1957-66, who were 15-24 in 1981; many of them entered the labor market after 
1981 so had no choice—they had to enter the new system; and 2) those who were born 
1921-30, who were 51-60 in 1981; they were unlikely to choose the new system even if 
they had high expected participation rates, because they had few years ahead of them in 
which to build their accounts before retirement. Both these groups are relatively free of 
selection bias. We compare participation rates within each system by cohort and across 
systems with the augmented versus the main sample. If selection bias exists, participation 
rates should differ between the choice and low-choice cohorts and the new-system effect 
will be smaller when the low-choice groups are included in the regression.  
This augmented sample, however, poses some problems. For example, the low-
choice group in the new system is observed only in a limited age range—40-49—which 
is outside the older workers age 50-70 on which we are focusing. In contrast, the low-
choice group in the old system is observed only over 50. This absence of overlap in birth 
years and observed ages means that we can’t simply compare the behavior of the two 
low-choice groups.  Moreover, the earlier cohorts will make the augmented old system 
sample more subject to deaths, survivor bias and other time-specific forces than is the 
main sample (see James, Edwards and Iglesias 2009 for fuller explication of this point).  
Indeed, these are the reasons why we didn’t confine our entire analysis to the low-choice 
groups.  28 
 
We proceed with hypotheses about the impact of selection bias. If workers with 
high expected participation rates have selected into the new system, then: 
1. Within the new system, participation rates should be lower for the low-choice 
cohorts born 1957-66 than for earlier cohorts whose members voluntarily switched to the 
new system. As noted above, the cohort born 1957-66 is represented only in ages 40-49 in 
our sample. Therefore, to test this hypothesis we regress labor force participation rate on 
the usual co-variates, for age group 40-49 only, with cohort dummies for cohorts born 
1931-40, 1951-56 and 1957-66 (cohorts born 1941-50 are omitted)—for the new system 
only. As in our previous regressions, we control for age, education, marital status, and 
unemployment rate. A negative coefficient on cohort 1957-66 would be consistent with 
selection bias. Although the sign turns out to be negative, it is not significant either for 
men or women (Tables 4 and 5, Panel A, col. 1).  
2. Comparing across systems, the new system effect on participation should fall 
when the low choice cohort born 1957-66 is included in the sample. To test this 
hypothesis, we regress labor force participation rate on the usual co-variates, including 
the new system dummy—for new versus old system members.  Since the augmented 
cohorts are only present for ages 40-49, to capture them we must expand our age range to 
ages 40-70. Even in the absence of selection bias the new system effect is likely to be 
smaller for this expanded age range, since most prime-age men work in both systems. 
Therefore, to isolate the effect of the added low-choice cohorts, we re-estimate the main 
sample (cohorts 1931-56) for the expanded age range and compare with the system 
coefficient for the augmented sample (cohorts 1931-66). If the new-system effect is 
smaller in the augmented sample, this is consistent with selection bias. In fact, the new-29 
 
system coefficients are not significantly different between the augmented and main 
samples for either gender (Tables 4 and 5, Panel A, col. 2 versus 3). 
3. Within the old system, participation rates should be higher for the low-choice 
group born 1921-30 than for later cohorts whose members had more opportunity to 
switch. To test this hypothesis we regress labor force participation rates on the usual co-
variates in age group 50-70, with cohort dummies for cohorts born 1921-30, 1931-40 and 
1951-56 (cohorts born 1941-50 are omitted)—for the old system only. A positive 
coefficient on cohort 1921-30 would be consistent with selection bias. In fact, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant for women and it is significantly negative for 
men (Tables 4 and 5, Panel B, col. 1). 
4. Comparing across systems, the new system effect on participation should fall 
when the low choice cohort born 1921-30 is included. To test this hypothesis, we regress 
labor force participation rates on the usual co-variates, including the new system 
dummy—for  age group 50-70, for new versus old system members.  A smaller new 
system effect in the augmented sample would be consistent with selection bias. We found 
no significant difference between the augmented and main samples for either gender 
(Tables 4 and 5, Panel B, col. 2 versus 3). 
5. The new system effect on participation should fall when both low choice 
cohorts, born 1921-30 and 1957-66 are included. Finally, we ran our regressions with the 
fully augmented sample for ages 40-70, for new versus  old system members. A smaller 
new system effect in the augmented sample, as compared with the main sample for these 
ages, would be consistent with selection bias. Again, there was no significant difference 
for either gender (Table 4, Panel A, col. 3 versus 4). 30 
 
Thus, the addition of groups for which there is little or no choice of system has no 
impact on the new-system effect. Labor force participation rates increase by about 10 
percentage points in all cases for men, which is about 15% of the old-system participation 
rate. It increases by about 20 percentage points for women, which is 55% of the old-
system rate. In addition, as discussed in the next section, the average labor force 
participation rate for both systems combined has increased over time, as the proportion of 
new-system affiliates has grown. This shows that behavioral change, and not merely a 
rearrangement of people with unchanged work propensities, is involved. (for   
corroborating evidence based on cohort analysis, see Edwards and James 2008).  
Maturation bias 
In our efforts to measure the impact of system rules on individual behavior, we 
restrict our analysis to individuals affiliated to the new or old system. The “new-system 
effect” depicts the increased probability of working for an otherwise identical person who 
happens to be affiliated to the new rather than the old system. That is, “affiliates” are 
taken as a proxy for potential workers and eventual pension recipients in that system. A 
problem occurs because the relationship between current workers and affiliates is 
different for new and old systems. Only workers can join the new system, and all new 
entrants to the labor force must also join. In contrast, the old system has members who 
worked in the past, then retired, became informal or withdrew from the labor force; they 
are not potential workers now. This is a special case of selection, in which the selection 
occurs not by worker choice but because of the way system affiliation is assigned or 
defined. Consequently, the ratio of workers/affiliates will fall dramatically as the system 
matures, simply because “affiliates” rises faster than “workers”, by definition. 31 
 
Comparisons of work probabilities among affiliates are biased in favor of immature new 
systems, due to this “system maturation effect.”  
This problem is especially great for women. Many older women entered the labor 
force for the first time in the 1980’s and 1990’s, after their child-rearing years, because of 
changing social norms and economic growth during this period. These women all had to 
enter the new system. Then, the extremely high apparent new-system effect for women 
may be due, in part, to the forced selection of this large group into the new system. 
 If the new system effect were simply due to maturation bias, it would disappear 
over time, as the proportion of affiliates who were not potential workers was equalized 
for the two systems. Also, if we regressed the probability of work over the two systems 
combined in a given year, as a function of the share of new-system affiliation, the latter 
should be insignificant if only system maturation was at work, but it should have a 
significant positive coefficient if real behavioral change in the new system was involved. 
We carried out this exercise (including age and education as co-variates) and found that 
the average participation rate goes up significantly, by .2 percentage points for men, .1 
percentage points for women, for every percentage point increase in the proportion of 
total affiliates who are in the new system (Table 6).
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In sum, some maturation bias is undoubtedly present, especially for women, but 
this does not tell the whole story—the growing membership in the new system increases 
aggregate participation rates. This regression is also another indication that selection of 
system by workers who had a choice is not the full explanation. The   
  individual-level regressions by system show higher participation probabilities for   
affiliates of the new system, because of the incentives and constraints that they face, and 
the regressions of participation probabilities by year combining both systems show that as 32 
 
the new system is phased in, labor supply rises for the economy as a whole; we are not 
simply observing biases caused by system selection or maturation.  
V. Conclusion 
Many countries with aging populations are seeking ways to increase work 
propensities and delay pension probabilities of their older workers. Chile is an unusual 
case in that the labor force participation rates of its older workers have been increasing 
and pension probabilities decreasing for the past 25 years. We argue that this is mainly 
due to incentives and constraints stemming from its new social security system.  
Pre-reform Chile looked like many European countries today—with early and 
declining age of pension and withdrawal from the labor force. These incentives, 
constraints and trends were sharply reversed in 1981, when a new pension system with 
pro-work incentives and constraints was adopted. We hypothesize that participation rates 
of older workers will increase due to: 1) Greater incentives for pensioners to continue 
working because the new system eliminates restrictions that existed previously and 
exempts pensioners from the pension payroll tax; 2) Greater actuarial fairness, which 
may lead to postponed pensioning and higher participation rates of non-pensioners on a 
voluntary basis because of the smaller implicit tax; 3) Tighter early pension pre-
conditions, which constrain more individuals to remain non-pensioners and to continue 
working because of liquidity constraints; 4) Tighter eligibility conditions for the MPG, 
which induce low earners to work longer; and (5) new treatment of survivors’ benefits, 
which allowed recipients to also keep their own-benefit and thereby induce widows and  
women more broadly to work longer.  
We use probit analysis of data of a retrospective sample of new and old system 
affiliates to test these hypotheses about pension probabilities and labor force participation 33 
 
rates in the new versus the old systems. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses. 
We estimate an increase of 10 percentage points or 15% in the participation rates of older 
men, and 20 percentage points or 55% in participation rates of older women, who are 
new-system members.  Pensioners experience the largest impact; the effect on non-
pensioners is also significant, but much smaller. This suggests that the removal of work 
restrictions and exemption from the pension payroll tax is a more potent incentive than 
the move toward actuarial fairness. Actuarial fairness is difficult concept for workers to 
understand and calculate. In addition, the new system remains only partially fair given 
that it imposes higher savings rates than would be voluntarily chosen by workers. 
Another large part of the total new-system effect stems from tighter early retirement 
restrictions that constrain individuals to postpone pensioning and continue working. 
Particularly noteworthy is the huge (140%) increase in work propensities by new-system 
recipients of survivors’ benefits, as the 100% implicit tax that many of them previously 
faced on own-pension has now been eliminated.  
Although individual characteristics and macro-economic cycles have significant 
impacts on participation rates, they do not erase these reform effects. Moreover, the 
changes we find are inconsistent with an explanation based on selection or maturation, 
since they produce an over-all increase in labor force participation rather than simply a 
rearrangement between groups.  
These results have important policy implications. They suggest that, regardless of 
other features of the system, the labor supply of older individuals can be increased 
substantially by 1) raising the reward that older individuals receive for working, for 
example by exempting them from the pension payroll tax; 2) raising the earliest 
allowable age for pensioning or doing so automatically and gradually by tying pension 34 
 
age to life expectancy; and 3) financing survivors’ benefits in a way that makes it feasible 
for women who have worked and contributed to keep their own-pensions as well.
17 
Countries that wish to retain older individuals in the labor force might consider adopting 
these policies. 35 
 
Appendix: Hypotheses and results re other co-variates 
We include many other co-variates in our probits, to control for their direct effect 
on pension probabilities and participation rates. 
Benefit amounts. The pension system may also exert an influence on participation 
via its impact on monthly pension payouts and social security wealth. During the period 
covered by this study, 1980-2006, inflation-adjusted pensions were rising, in Chile. In 
addition, at any point in time pension amounts varied by individual, depending on their 
work histories and education. The pension amount was determined by a formula in the 
old DB system, and by an actuarial conversation to an annuity or programmed 
withdrawal pension in the new DC system. Annuities have a constant real value while 
programmed withdrawals vary depending on rates of return and duration. For this study, 
we use the real value in 2006 in the regressions for the pensioner sub-sample. A higher 
benefit may lead pensioners to withdraw from the labor market via a wealth or income 
effect. But it may also signal that the individual has a higher potential wage, which may 
induce him or her to continue working, via the substitution effect. We are not sure a priori 
which effect will dominate. It turns out that pension amount has a negative impact on 
participation, implying that the wealth or income effect dominates, for men, but pension 
amount is insignificant for women. 
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Years since pension began. We expect that, even though the reform introduced 
incentives that disconnect the pension decision from the work decision, starting the 
pension remains the first stop toward labor force withdrawal, since it creates an 
alternative source of income. It signals that the worker is thinking about retiring. While 
he may postpone that decision, the more time elapses since pensioning the more likely he 
is to have withdrawn from the labor force and the harder it will be to re-enter. Consistent 36 
 
with this expectation, years since pensioning has a significant negative impact on 
participation rates, but this coefficient is significant only for men. 
Unemployment. During the post-reform period covered by this study, 
unemployment went through an entire cycle. From a high of 23% in 1982, it fell to 6% by 
1995 and then rose to 14% by 2002. We expect pension probabilities to rise and LFP to 
fall during cyclical downturns in the economy, due to the discouraged worker effect, the 
difficulty older workers may experience in obtaining new jobs when laid off from their 
existing jobs, and the greater ease of meeting early retirement pre-conditions. It turns out 
that, for men, pension probabilities fell significantly during periods of high 
unemployment, while for women there is no significant unemployment effect. However, 
the negative impact of unemployment on participation rates are strongly significant both 
for men and women.  
Cohort. Our observations occurred over a 20-year time span, during which 
education levels and income per capita rose, an entire business cycle occurred  and social 
norms regarding the role of women changed. Our inclusion of education levels and 
unemployment rate accounted for some of these changes but not all. To control for other 
secular trends in participation rates that were unrelated to pension system, we identify 
each individual by his cohort group (born 1921-30, 1931-40, 1941-50, 1951-56, 1957-66) 
in all specifications. 
Variables added for the 2006 cross-sectional analysis. For some individual-level 
variables that vary over time, we do not have information for each year but we do have 
this information for the sample year, 2006. These variables—number of children, spousal 
work and pension status, knowledge about the system, health status, other savings and 
household income per capita—will be included in a supplementary cross-sectional 37 
 
analysis for 2006 but they were not included in our panel analysis. 38 
 
    
 
 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
 
  Men Women   








Percentage working  0.745 0.806 0.652 0.480 0.615  0.356 
Percentage married  0.746 0.759 0.727 0.581 0.553  0.607 





0.192 0.279  0.370 0.194 
orn in 1931-1940  0.442 0.339 0.597 0.425 0.242  0.593 
Born in 1941-1950  0.429 0.478 0.356 0.433 0.522  0.351 
Born in 1951-1956  0.129 0.183 0.047 0.142 0.236  0.057 
Mean Age  56.77 56.04 57.857  56.7 55.4  57.9 
Percentage Old-Age pensioners  0.246 0.183 0.341 0.191 0.101  0.273 
Percentage survivors’ pensions  na na na    0.060 0.063  0.057 
Percentage in New System  0.600 1.000 0.000 0.479 1  0 
# obs  34,070 20,438 13,632 24,978 11,976  13,002 39 
 
            
 
 
Table 2: Probability of Old-Age Pension: Marginal Effect of New System  








Marginal effect of new system 
  Age 50-
59   
Age 60-
64  
Age 65-70  
Men 
At sample means

















59   
At sample means


















1 Probit coefficients are reported in Table A1. 
  Sample excludes disability and 
PASIS pensioners and non-affiliates. 
2   Marginal effects calculated at the sample means except for Dummy 60/65 that 
is set at zero for consistency. 
* significant at 0.1% 
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Table 3: Probability of Work: Marginal Effect of New System   
(Calculated at Different Values of Covariates, affiliates ages 50-70, birth years 
1931-56)
1 
   Marginal  Effects-new 
system 
Marginal 
Effect as % of 
probability of 
work in old 
system
3 











(3)  (3)/(1) (2)/(1) 
   Men    
At sample means
2  .652 .101* .068*  10%  15% 
   Non-pensioner  .768  .062*  8%   




.658 .093* .057*  9%  14% 
   Non-pensioner  .800  .049*  6%   




.651 .103* .072*  11%  16% 
   Non-pensioner  .762  .064*  8%   
   Old Age Pensioner  .399  .090*  23%   
  Women 
At sample means
2  .356 0.197
* 0.194
* 55%  55% 
   Non-pensioner  .414   0.193
* 47%   
   Survivor pensioner  .121   0.170
* 140%   
   Old age pensioner
3  .264   0.179





* 0.184*  39%  42% 
   Non-pensioner  .594   0.178
* 30%   
   Survivor pensioner  .167   0.190
* 114%   
   Old age pensioner
3  .297   0.193





* 0.192*  58%  58% 
   Non-pensioner  .375   0.194
* 52%   
   Survivor pensioner  .115   0.157
* 137%   
   Old Age Pensioner
3  .253   0.169
* 67%   
 
1    Probit coefficients are reported in Table A2. 
  Sample excludes disability and PASIS 
pensioners and non-affiliates. 
2   Marginal effects calculated at the sample means of covariates except for Dummy 60/65 
that is set at zero for consistency. 
3   (3)/(1) gives the proportional increase in participation rates in the new system relative 
to initial values in the old system, holding pensioner status constant. (2)/(1) gives the 
proportional new-system effect relative to initial values in the old system, taking into 
account the increase in number of non-pensioners as pension age is postponed in the new 
system. 




Table 4: Selection Experiments, Probit regressions: Marginal Effects--Men 
Calculated at Sample Mean for Main Sample vs Expanded Samples
1  
  





    










  (1)     (2)  (3)  (4) 




Covariates          
Coh 1921-30         -0.056
* 




Coh 1951-56  0.013   0.000  0.000  0.000 

















Secondary degree   0.105




Unemployment Rate  -0.002




          
# observations  30,932   64,773  74,395  83,349 
Probability of work  .918  .812  .825  .792 
Panel B. Ages 50-70 
Sample 
Affiliates in 
Old System  
  Affiliates in New and Old Systems,  
Ages 50-70  
Birth Year 
1921-57 






  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 




Covariates            
Coh 1921-30  -0.120
*   -0.077
*    
Coh 1931-40  -0.075
*   -0.055
* -0.054
*  
Coh 1951-56  -0.086
m  -0.029  -0.022  -0.025 
Age  -0.019




Dummy Age 60+  -0.112












Unemployment Rate  -0.006




        
# observations  20,866  43,024  34,070  19,004 
Probability of work  .599  .699  .745  .817 
1   Sample excludes disability and PASIS pensioners and non-affililates 
*    significant at 0.1% 
**  significant at 1% 
m  marginally significant at 10% 43 
 
      Table 5: Selection Experiments, Probit Regresions: Marginal Effects—Women  
Calculated at Sample Mean for Main Sample vs Expanded Samples  





    
Affiliates in New and Old Systems, 
Ages 40-70  
Birth Year 
1931-67 






  (1)     (2)  (3)  (4) 




Covariates            
Coh 1921-30  --  --  --  0.009 









Coh 1957-66  -0.151   --  -0.163
* -0.168
* 























# observations  22,630  48,228  56,481  63,036 
# individuals  3,214  2,667  4,379  4,787 
Probability of work  .680  .555  .565  .531 
Panel B. Ages 50-70  
Sample 
Affiliates in 
Old System  
  Affiliates in the New and Old Systems  
Ages 50-70  
Birth Year 
1921-57 






  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 




Covariates            
Coh 1921-30  0.009  0.014  --  -- 
Coh 1931-40  0.043  0.031  0.029  -- 
























Unemployment Rate  -0.003   -0.004
** -0.009
* -0.001 
# observations  19,086  31,533  24,978  14,370 
# individuals  1,423  2,846  2,438  1,863 
Probability of work  .325  .438  .480  .544 
1   Sample excludes disability and PASIS pensioners and non-affiliates. 
*    significant at 0.1% 
**  significant at 1% 
***significant at 5% 
m        marginally significant at 10% 44 
 
    Table 6: Testing for Maturation Bias: impact on aggregate participation rates 
over time of rising proportion of new-system affiliates 
 Coefficient  Standard  error  Coefficient Standard  error 
 Men  Women 
constant    .724*  .015  .441*  .012 
Age  -.02* .0007  -.021*  .0007 
Secondary 
degree 





  .197*  .021  .097*  .019 
1 controlling for year, gender, age and secondary degree 
* significant at 0.1%45 
 
 Table A1: Observations by Age and Cohort—Men and Women 
 
Men Women 














         
50  834 1,273 1,130 3,237 569 927 922  2,418 
51  832 1,263  932 3,027 568 925 747  2,240 
52  828 1,248  767 2,843 567 920 615  2,102 
53  821 1,238  579 2,638 565 916 482  1,963 
54  817 1,218  453 2,488 563 904 370  1,837 
55  807 1,198  307 2,312 558 890 237  1,685 
56  803 1,173  173 2,149 553 878 147  1,578 
57  789 1,141  42 1,972 550 853  39 1,442 
58  779 1,038    1,817 543 775    1,318 
59  773 889    1,662 536 663    1,199 
60  752 746    1,498 530 554    1,084 
61  743 625    1,368 521  457  978 
62  733 529    1,262 518  387  905 
63  720 407    1,127 516  300  816 
64  698 296    994 505  213  718 
65  680 208    888 486  144  630 
66  652 103    755 471 84    555 
67  617 28    645 452 21    473 
68  545     545 406    406 
69  457     457 342    342 
70  386     386 289    289 
           
Total  15,066 14,621  4,383 34,070 10,608  10,811 3,559 24,978 
         
%new 










    Table A2: Probit Regression for Probability of Pension 
1  
 
Sample  New and Old System Affiliates  
Ages 50–70
  
Birth Year 1931-56 
  Coefficient   Standard 
error  
Coefficient    Standard 
error  
  Men   Women  




Coh 1931-40  -0.118
** 0.058  0.129
m 0.072 
Coh 1951-56  -0.142




Dummy Age 60+     0.721
* 0.060 
Dummy Age 65+  0.523
* 0.058     
Married  0.301
* 0.061  -0.137
*** 0.067 




Unemployment Rate  0.018
** 0.006  0.012  0.009 
       
New System*Age50-55  -0.620
* 0.064 -0.496
* 0.103 
New System*Age56-64  0.334
* 0.058     
New System*Age56-59     -0.407
* 0.090 
       
# of observations   34,070  24,978   
# individuals  3,267  2,438   
       
Log likelihood  -14327.127       -8403.7827      
1   Sample excludes disability and PASIS pensioners and non-affiliates. 
Standard Error adjusted for 2438 clusters 
*    significant at 0.1% 
**  significant at 1% 
***significant at 5% 
m       marginally significant at 10% 
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Table A3: Probit Regressions for the Probability of Work
1  
 
Sample  New and Old System Affiliates, Ages 50–70
Birth Year 1931-56 








  Men   Women  











Coh 1931-40  -0.177
* -0.224
* 0.072  0.066 

























Old Age Pensioner   -0.637
*  -0.208
** 
   *Pension size   -0.001
*   -0.000 
   *Years since 
pension   -0.022
*   -0.015 
Survivor’s  pension  Na Na    -0.219
* 
   *pension size  Na   Na     -0.002
m 
   *years since 
pension   Na      -0.008 





      
# observations  34,070 34,070  24,978  24,978 
# individuals  3,267 3,267  2,438  2,438 
Log likelihood  -17243.404    -16161.942    -15413.58         -15272.91      
1   Sample excludes disability and PASIS pensioners and non-affiliates.  Std. 
Err. adjusted for 2438 clusters 
*    significant at 0.1% 
**  significant at 1% 
***significant at 5% 
m        marginally significant at 10% 
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50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70















50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70




























































Source: U de Chile Employment Surveys
Male pension rates by age over time
 
 





























































Source: U de Chile Employment Surveys
pensioners and non-pensioners compared
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 For preliminary descriptive statistics on labor supply impact see Edwards and Edwards 
(2002). Gruber (1997) studied the incidence of the payroll tax in Chile. Edwards and 
James 2008 used birth cohort as a proxy for new system membership and studied changes 
over time in labor force participation of older workers, as the new system was phased in. 
 
2 These descriptions are based on SAFP 2003, Cheyre 1991 and personal 
communications with Augusto Iglesias, Primamerica Consultores.  
 
3 While employers paid 2/3 of the 23% tax in the old system, workers pay the entire tax 
in the new system, an increase from 7.25% to 12.5% of wages. In the short run, wage 
increases were legally required for workers who switched, to compensate for the tax 
saving to employers and new tax paid by workers. In that case, gross and net wages 
would have increased. We don’t know how effectively that requirement was implemented 
or how markets responded to the changed tax rate. Real wages have risen, on average, 
about 2% per year over the last 25 years. 
 
4 There were some variations by sub-system. Retirement age was even lower before the 
old system was reformed, for fiscal reasons, in the late 1970’s. Early retirement and 
evasion resulted in a contributor/ pensioner ratio of 2.2 in 1980, lower than in the U.S. 
today, despite a much younger population in Chile. 
 
5 Although these restrictions appear to be high, the majority of pensioners since 1988 
have been early pensioners, consistent with our expectation that most individuals will 
start their pension as soon as possible. The implied age of eligibility varies widely across 
individuals, so we do not expect bumps in retirement at any particular point until age 65. 
 
6  More precisely, if the individual has annuitized his or her retirement accumulation and 
the MPG rises above the annuity level, the government tops up the annuity. If, in 
contrast, the individual has taken gradual withdrawals from his or her account, the 
government requires that these withdrawals must be at least equal to the MPG level, and 
once the account is used up the treasury pays the entire pension.  
  
7 In 2008 the government has recently started replacing the MPG with a means-tested 
basic benefit that will be targeted toward the 60% poorest households in the economy, 
including non-contributors, creating yet another set of incentives. We reserve this topic 
for further investigation using a different data set and focus on the broader incentives 
outlined above, in this paper. The entire period of this analysis was prior to 2008. 
 
8 For example: a worker may be forced to save at a higher rate than he would prefer; he 
wishes to start his pension sooner than the retirement age rules permit; he wishes to use 
his saving to cover emergency or other consumption in the early years of retirement; he 
prefers to invest in different ways from those permitted by regulations.  Until 2002 
workers had a choice of investment manager but virtually no choice of investment 
strategy. Since 2002 greater choice of investment options has been allowed but this is still 
limited to 4 or 5 portfolios. Workers who wish to put all their funds into stocks or foreign 
investments are not allowed to do so. Investment options during the payout phase are 53 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
even more tightly constrained. Until 2004 only fixed annuities or gradual withdrawals 
based on conservative investments were allowed. Individuals who are in ill-health may 
not expect to get back their full premiums through annuities or gradual withdrawals. 
 
9 The estimate of a 50% implicit tax is based on wage differentials between workers who 
pay the payroll tax and get benefits versus those who don’t (Edwards and Edwards 2002). 
For a related UK analysis see Disney 2004.  
 
10  Several forces in the new system may counteract this tax wedge and lead to some 
postponement of pensioning. Non-pensioners who contribute get access to disability and 
survivors insurance at a community rate that is advantageous (below true risk cost) for 
older workers; they lose this access once they start their pension. Retirees will be entitled 
to a higher minimum pension guarantee if they start their pension later; therefore workers 
who expect low pensions will gain if they postpone pensioning. Those with less than 20 
years of contributions may delay pensioning until they meet this condition for eligibility 
for the MPG. Finally, pensions are taxable so postponing pensions also postpones taxes.  
 
11  The 2006 survey was actually carried out between October 2006 and March 2007. 
Therefore, in the cohort born 1956 we are including individuals born up to March 1957, 
who turned 50 up to March 2007, and similarly for other cohort and age groups. 
Individuals who died before 1982 were not included in the sample frame. Those who 
died after 1982 were included, and information about them was obtained from system 
records and relatives. We omitted dead individuals from our analysis because of missing 
information. This probably resulted in an under-representation of old system members, 
who tended to be older and therefore more likely to die. However, there is no reason to 
believe that this omission biased our results. For a fuller discussion of deaths and survival 
bias in an analysis of disability hazards, where it potentially biased the results, see James, 
Edwards and Iglesias 2009. 
 
12 Being out of the labor force in period 1 increases the likelihood of being out in period 
2, and this likelihood and inter-period correlation increase with age, but nevertheless, 
individuals move in and out of spells of employment and non-employment until age 65 
and beyond. (See Meghir and Whitehouse 1997 for an analysis of detailed British data on 
this subject). We treat each year as independent. 
 
13  In follow-up work we plan to analyze the 2006 cross-section in greater detail, adding 
individual-specific variables for which we do not have year-by-year information, such as 
number of children, spousal age differential, whether the spouse worked or was 
pensioned, household income per capita, other saving, health status and knowledge about 
the system. We plan to investigate, in particular, whether health status and knowledge 
influence system choice and new-system effect. 
 
14  We alternatively measured education as a continuous variable—years of schooling. 
The reform impact was very similar in both cases. Besides the cross-sectional differences 
among individuals at a point in time, Major changes in educational levels took place in 
Chile over the lifetime of the individuals in our study, especially for women. For 
example, 80% of all women aged 16-65 has less than full secondary education in 1970 54 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
but this proportion had fallen to 44% by 2000. Therefore, educational levels differed 
widely across affiliates of different ages and cohorts, in our sample. 
 
  
15 A number of other factors, not directly related to age or expected participation rates, 
also entered into the decision. For example, workers in less generous old system 
programs (with lower replacement rates or longer service required for a full pension) 
would be more likely to switch. Those who had optimistic expectations about future 
investment returns were more likely to switch. And employers sometimes encouraged 
switching, because this would free them of the 23% payroll tax. 
 
16  Part of the effect for women may still be due to the correlation between the numerator 
and denominator of this term—women’s aggregate labor force participation rate 
increased during the period 1981-2006 due to changing education and social norms, over 
the same period when new-system membership was increasing. 
 
17 Consistent with these findings, removal of the retirement earnings test (a high implicit 
tax rate on pensioner wages) has produced a large increase in work propensities of older 
individuals in the DB system in the U.S.  See Song and Manchester 2006. Sweden’s 
notional DC plan, Germany’s point system and Finland’s defined benefit scheme have 
tied monthly benefit amount to life expectancy but they have not tied retirement age to 
benefit amount, except on a voluntary basis. 
 
18  On average, replacement rates were falling during the post-reform period, because 
wages were rising faster than pensions. Also, monthly payouts on new annuity contracts 
decrease as longevity increases. This might have exerted a positive impact on 
participation rates. We cannot include replacement rates in these data, because we don’t 
know the individual’s previous wage rate.  
 